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1The Cobweb Effect in Balancing Markets with
Demand Response
Emil M. Larsen, Pierre Pinson, Jianhui Wang, Yi Ding, Jacob Østergaard
Abstract—Integration of renewable energy sources (RES) like
wind into the power system is a high priority in many countries,
but it becomes increasingly difficult as renewables reach a
significant share of generation. Demand response (DR) can
potentially mitigate some of these difficulties, but the best way
to control and integrate DR into the power system remains an
open question. Integration into existing electricity markets is one
option, but dynamic pricing with DR has been observed to be
unstable, resulting in oscillations in supply and demand. This so-
called Cobweb effect is presented here using the market structure
and measurements from the EcoGrid EU demonstration, where
five minute electricity pricing is sent to 1900 houses. A new tool
for quantifying volatility is presented, and the causes for volatility
are investigated. A key outcome of this study shows that increases
in social welfare due to DR appear to be limited by the cost of
volatility in existing market structures.
Index Terms—Demand response (DR), demand forecasting,
real-time pricing, volatility, smart grid.
NOMENCLATURE
t ∈ T Index for time
g ∈ G Index for conventional generation
n ∈ N Index for demand model parameters
s ∈ S Index for scenario
qt,s Scenario probability
ct,s Real-time demand
θn Demand model parameters
θλ Price-elasticity parameters
cDt Day-ahead demand forecast
cλt,s Demand response
cshedt,s Load shedding
λDt Day-ahead price for demand
λRt Real-time price for demand
λshed Price for load shedding
λspill Price for wind spillage
Bt,s System imbalance
pDg,t Conventional generation scheduled day-ahead
wDt Wind power day-ahead forecast
w
spill
t,s Wind power spillage
λ
↑
g,t, λ
↓
g,t Price for up/down regulation
p
↑
g,t,s, p
↓
g,t,s Up/down regulation delivered
P
↑
g,t, P
↓
g,t Up/down regulation bid into market
Manuscript submitted 11/05/2015. This work was partly supportly
by the European Commission through the project EcoGrid EU (grant
ENER/FP7/268199) and by Mogens Balslev’s Foundation.
E. M. Larsen, P. Pinson and J. Østergaard are with the Centre for Electric
Power and Energy, Technical University of Denmark, Kgs. Lyngby, Denmark
(email: {emlar,ppin,joe}@elektro.dtu.dk). J. Wang is at Argonne National
Laboratory, USA (email: {jianhui.wang@anl.gov}). Y. Ding is at Zhejiang
University, China (email: {yiding@zju.edu.cn}.
ng,t,s,mg,t,sUp/down regulation on/off
rg,t Generator ramp rate
I. INTRODUCTION
DEMAND response (DR) is being strongly pursued be-cause it increases the value of renewable energy sources
(RES) when they are available, provides some additional
capacity when renewables are not available, and balances the
system when renewables do not behave as predicted [1]. In
Denmark, the shift to RES meant that wind power met 39%
of national electricity consumption in 2014, and is well on
its way to hitting goals of 50% electricity consumption from
wind power in 2020, and 100% of all energy consumption
from renewable energy in 2050 [2].
There are many dynamic and static electricity price tariffs
that can be used to activate DR, but two methods in particular
have gained traction in recent years due to their fast activation
characteristics that compliment the uncertainty in RES gen-
eration. These are direct control, where utilities turn devices
on and off remotely, and indirect control, where an incentive
signal, e.g. an electricity price, is used to influence the load
to change its consumption. Direct control is typically targeted
at medium and large commercial and industrial loads and has
the challenges of requiring reliable communication equipment,
while indirect control is aimed at a large number of small-
scale loads and has challenges of predictability [3], [4]. Key
benefits of indirect control include lower equipment costs and,
when a price-based mechanism is used, there can be a clear
value attributed to the resource. When used in conjunction
with a market, indirect control has the additional benefit of
improving liquidity and lowering the cost of supply, since it
reduces the market power of price-maker generators. However,
true market-based pricing sent to supply and demand has long
been associated with unstable behavior, as first identified in
[5], where it was named the Cobweb effect due to the spider
web-like back-and-forth oscillations that occur when a stable
market equilibrium cannot be achieved.
The Cobweb effect has traditionally been studied in markets
where demand for a commodity, for example apples, was
higher or lower than supply had expected. The following
season, apple growers then change their production level, but
the market becomes over- or under-supplied and an overshoot
causes demand to behave in a seemingly opposite fashion
to what had been experienced the previous season. If every
market participant has a perfect forecast of supply and demand,
then the Cobweb effect should not happen, but uncertainty is
usually present in markets. This is true in a modern power
2system and especially true for DR [6]. Electricity market clear-
ing algorithms must also make assumptions about demand,
including linearising non-linear behavior, in order to find a
feasible and timely solution in an optimization framework.
This can result in power and prices being more volatile than
is optimal, as seen in Fig. 1. Here, an imbalance that exists
only at the first time step where supply and demand intersect,
oscillates outwards as the initial decision leads to a greater
imbalance (feedback) in subsequent steps.
In this paper, we investigate the Cobweb effect using the
market structure and data collected from the EcoGrid EU
project, which is an indirect control demonstration on the Dan-
ish island of Bornholm. The EcoGrid EU demonstration has
1900 residential households with a peak load of 5MW. Houses
are equipped with smart meters and a range of distributed
energy resources (DERs) with automated controllers that re-
ceive a new electricity price every five minutes and optimize
consumption levels accordingly. DR from these customers is
scheduled optimally with manual reserves from conventional
generation in a market structure to meet the imbalance caused
by wind power. A mathematical introduction to the EcoGrid
EU market can be found in [7].
The contribution of this work lies in identifying the different
causes of volatility, identifying volatility in realistic real-time
market that respects Scandinavian generation constraints and
was developed in conjunction with the Danish Transmission
System Operator (TSO), Energinet.dk, and developing an
intuitive method for measuring volatility. We also investigate
the impact the Cobweb effect has on social welfare, and the
influence market re-commitment frequency has on volatility
and social welfare. We believe the latter to be important as
system operators move to shorter settlement periods, like the
five minute period in the novel EcoGrid EU market.
The paper is structured with section II presenting existing
knowledge of the Cobweb effect. Section III describes the
simulation components, which include a model of the demand
based on EcoGrid EU measurements, the market structure,
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Fig. 1. The Cobweb effect in the EcoGrid EU market, where the settlement
trajectory starts at the intersection of the initial supply (Nord Pool bid data)
and demand (EcoGrid EU demand model) curves shown.
and a tool for measuring volatility. Section IV presents results
for social welfare and volatility from simulations and the real
experiment. The final section concludes.
II. THE COBWEB EFFECT
Since initially investigated in 1938, the Cobweb effect
was expanded to markets with non-linear supply and demand
curves in [8], where it was also shown that the Cobweb effect
happens with monotonic demand and supply curves, as is
the case in electricity markets. In [9], the impact of demand
expectation using auto-regressive methods on the Cobweb
effect was identified. Traditional economics literature has been
more focused on identifying the problem and improving the
expectation of demand, including considering larger forecast
horizons, leading to more stable market outcomes [10]. So-
lutions other than a better demand forecast have not been
explored. Recent economics research on the Cobweb effect
has moved to analyzing games between different players, the
result of which is an equilibrium with the lowest forecast error
on both the supply and demand side [11].
In the field of power system research, market-based volatil-
ity due to real-time pricing was first identified in [12], where
it was noted that there is an upper limit on the market clearing
time and the delay of the price signal beyond which the
system becomes unstable. Here it was shown that delaying
communication of the price sent to customers increased system
stability greatly, while increasing the gate-closure time led
to fragile system behavior. Cobweb-like volatility has been
particularly problematic when using models from the New
York ISO power system [13], however, the authors there used a
mirror image of supply to represent demand in the absence of
reliable information about its actual shape. In addition, authors
there also assumed demand would only be non-linear with
respect to time, but not conditional on past and future prices.
Recently, [14] identified the boundaries for volatility when
closed-loop real-time pricing structures are used without an
appropriate feedback law. No remedy was offered for the
closed-loop instabilities simulated in this research, but it was
noted that price volatility increases as the price-elasticity of
consumers increases with respect to the price-elasticity of sup-
pliers, indicating that volatility will vary from power system
to power system. Real data was not used in [14], highlighted
by a demand profile with eight peaks per day, rather than
the archetypal one or two daily peaks. Consequently, there
remains a lack of evidence about how much volatility will
truly be observed in a power system with DR and real-time
pricing, hence our curiosity as to whether the Cobweb effect
is observable or significant in a realistic market setup.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section, a model of demand based upon the data
collected in the EcoGrid EU demonstration is described. The
market structure is presented and measures for volatility are
defined. The demand model is used with the market to simulate
several weeks of operation assuming that indirect control was
rolled-out nationwide in Denmark.
3A. Model of the Demand
Demand is broken down into non-interacting parts com-
prised of autoregressive components that are a function of
recent demand, a component that is dependent on the price,
and a component that is only dependent on external variables
using the notation from [15], [16]. An initial abstract split of
the price and non-price responsive parts is considered,
ct = f (c˜t−1, z˜t) + g
(
λ˜t, z˜t
)
(1)
with
c˜t−1 = [ct−1, . . . , ct−nc ]
⊤
λ˜t = [λt+uλ , . . . , λt−nλ ]
⊤
z˜t = [zt+uz , . . . , zt−nz ]
⊤
where nc, nλ and nz are a finite number of lagged values
of demand, c, price, λ, and external variables, z respectively.
For the price and external variables there are uλ and uz
forecast values, which capture the scheduling dynamics of
DERs. External variables, z, include weather data such as
temperature, wind speed, and solar irradiance, as well as a base
load term, y. The base load is a Fourier series that describes
demand due to the time of day, day of the week, and day of
the month [17], such that, for a given time t,
yt = a0 +
J∑
j=1
aj sin
(
2πkt
j
)
+ bj cos
(
2πkt
j
)
(2)
The cardinality of j must be suitably large to cover different
seasonal variations (for example 288 when capturing trends
of different hours of the day using five minute data) and k is
increased until enough high-resolution detail is captured.
The full model for demand can be expressed in general
linear model form, i.e.
ct = c˜
⊤
t−1θc + λ˜
⊤
t θλ + z˜
⊤
t θzǫt = x
⊤
t θ + ǫt (3)
where ǫt is Gaussian noise with zero mean and finite variance.
Variables c, λ and z were populated with measurements
from 2014 and the parameters θ of the general linear model
were found by minimizing the residual sum of squares while
shrinking parameters using the Lasso penalisation [18], the
objective of which is
min
T∑
t=1
(
ct −
I∑
i=1
θixi,t
)2
+ η
N∑
i=1
|θi| (4)
where η is the tuning parameter and is found using a 10-
fold cross-validation routine, minimising the error over all
folds. Fig. 2 shows the main outcome of the price terms in
the general linear model for the coldest six months of the
year. DR peaks 20 minutes after the price change, and the
main response lasts for 90 minutes before a rebound effect is
observed. Smart controllers prepare in the hour preceding price
change by scheduling an opposing response, causing load to
shift.
The relationship between price and demand has previously
been observed to be non-linear [15], and we model this by
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Fig. 2. Finite impulse response (FIR) of the EcoGrid EU demand in 2014,
corresponding to the parameters θλ peaking at 36kW when given a e 10 price
decrease at t0.
redefining the price terms in a generalised logistic function
that is centred around zero, i.e.
cλt =
nλ∑
t=1
−
At
2
+
At
1 + e−εtλt
(5)
where cλt contains only price information with other linear
components removed. Parameters in this model are found by
minimising the sum of square errors using the Levenberg-
Marquardt algorithm [19], with the linear parameters for price
used as starting estimates for ε. The upper and lower bounds
of the price response are the amplitude of the logistic function
and are defined with respect to the instantaneous price only
(at t = 1), so that
c
λ,max
t =
|A1|
2
(6)
c
λ,min
t = −
|A1|
2
(7)
The final demand model exhibits a non-linear response to
price and behaves dynamically according to future and past
prices. The model has been used to forecast demand in real-
time in the EcoGrid EU demonstration, with a five-minute
ahead mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) of under 2%
for 1900 houses.
B. Market Structure
The EcoGrid EU demonstration has two hardware in-the-
loop market steps, as shown in Fig. 3, which were used to
generate five minute electricity pricing for 1900 houses in 2014
and 2015. Generator bids are based on historical Nord Pool bid
data, as shown in Fig. 1, while inflexible demand and wind
power injection comes from commercial real-time forecasts.
The imbalance signal is derived from the day-ahead wind
power forecast error, scaled by the Danish nominal capacity,
which is around 5%.
The first step is a day-ahead market that minimizes the
cost of conventional generation, considering the day-ahead
4wind power production forecast, the known Nord Pool spot
price, and the demand forecast including price-response to
spot prices. It is not the main area of focus, because it does
not generate the day-ahead price and demand is a fixed input.
This step is only needed to find reasonable and feasible starting
points for generators participating in the real-time market. The
overall problem reads
min
∑
g,t
λg,tp
D
g,t +
∑
t
λshedcshedt −
∑
t
λspillw
spill
t (8a)
subject to∑
g
pDg,t + w
D
t − w
spill
t = c
D
t − c
shed
t ∀t (8b)
pDg,t ≥ P
min
g ∀g, t (8c)
pDg,t ≤ P
max
g ∀g, t (8d)
pDg,t − p
D
g,t−1 ≤ rg,t ∀g, t (8e)
pDg,t−1 − p
D
g,t ≤ rg,t ∀g, t (8f)
Scheduled generation, day-ahead wind power forecasts,
wind spillage, load shedding and day-ahead load forecasts are
balanced in (8b). Wind power injection is a parameter that is
treated as a negative load. Minimum and maximum generation
is constrained in (8c) and (8d), while up and down ramp rates
are bound by rg,t in (8e) and (8f).
The second market step is the novel EcoGrid EU market,
where social welfare is maximized with respect to the day-
ahead market outcome. The market schedules an optimal
amount of manual reserves and flexible demand, and is formu-
lated as a stochastic optimization problem that commits bids
for conventional generation and creates real-time prices (RTP)
for demand until the market is cleared again. Unscheduled
and scheduled generation from the first market step is used as
the up and down regulation bids respectively in the real-time
market, i.e. p
↑
g,t,s = P
max
g − p
D
g,t and p
↓
g,t,s = p
D
g,t − P
min
g .
This yields
max
∑
t
∑
s
qt,s
{(
λDt c
λ
t,s + diag (θt,t′,s) 0.5c
λ
t,s
2
)
(9a)
−
∑
g
βg,t,s − λ
spillw
spill
t,s − λ
shedcshedt,s
}
Generator schedule 
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Fig. 3. Hardware-in-the-loop market structure of the EcoGrid EU demonstra-
tion.
subject to
cλt,s =
∑
t′
(
θt,t′,s
(
λRt − λ
D
t
))
∀t, s (9b)
cλt,s ≤ c
λ,max
t ∀t, s (9c)
cλt,s ≥ c
λ,min
t ∀t, s (9d)
cλt,s = 0 ∀s, t > h (9e)
ct,s = c
D
t − c
shed
t,s + c
λ
t,s ∀t, s (9f)
wt = w
D
t − w
spill
t,s ∀t, s (9g)
βg,t,s = λ
↑
g,tp
↑
g,t,s − λ
↓
g,tp
↓
g,t,s ∀g, t, s (9h)
pg,t,s =
∑
g
pDg,t,s + p
↑
g,t,s − p
↓
g,t,s ∀g, t, s (9i)
ct,s = pg,t,s + wt,s −Bt,s − et ∀t, s (9j)
∆p↑g,t,s = p
↑
g,t,s − p
↑
g,t−1,s ∀g, t, s (9k)
∆p↓g,t,s = p
↓
g,t,s − p
↓
g,t−1,s ∀g, t, s (9l)
∆p↑g,t,s = ∆p
↑
g,t−1,s ∀g, t, s, γt = 0 (9m)
∆p↓g,t,s = ∆p
↓
g,t−1,s ∀g, t, s, γt = 0 (9n)
∆p↑g,t,s = 0 ∀g, t, s, γt = 2 (9o)
∆p↓g,t,s = 0 ∀g, t, s, γt = 2 (9p)
p
↑
g,t,s ≤ ng,t,sp
↑
g,t,s ∀g, t, s (9q)
p
↓
g,t,s ≤ mg,t,sp
↓
g,t,s ∀g, t, s (9r)
p
↑
g,t,s ≥ ng,t,sχgp
↑
g,t,s ∀g, t, s, γt = 2 (9s)
p
↓
g,t,s ≥ mg,t,sχgp
↓
g,t,s ∀g, t, s, γt = 2 (9t)
ng,t,s = 0 ∀t, s, P
↑
g,t = 0 (9u)
mg,t,s = 0 ∀t, s, P
↓
g,t = 0 (9v)
p
↑
g,t,s ≤ dt,sp
↑
g,t,s ∀g, t, s (9w)
p
↓
g,t,s ≤ lt,sp
↓
g,t,s ∀g, t, s (9x)
dt,s + lt,s ≤ 1 ∀g, t, s, γt = 2 (9y)
The objective function (9a) maximises social welfare, where
the first term is customer utility and the last terms are cost
of generation and slack variables. Customer utility includes
the instantaneous price-elasticity, diag (θt,t′), and the change
in consumption due to all past and future prices, cλt . The
full finite impulse response (FIR) for price, θλ, which comes
from the demand model, is contained t’ times in the square
matrix (θt,t′), where the diagonal term represents t = 1 of
the FIR. Each price contribution to the load is summed for
all cross-elasticities in constraint (9b), giving the total DR
and the real-time price for demand, λRt . The EcoGrid EU
market produces separate prices for supply and demand when
supply and demand constraints are reached (e.g. generator
ramping), but identical ones when such constraints are not
binding. Actors that caused the imbalance receive the average
price for balancing power from supply and demand.
When cross-elasticity is ignored, as in Scandinavia today
and in the original EcoGrid EU design, then only the diagonal
term in θt,t′ is non-zero, and is fixed to the average FIR from
the general linear model parameters (3) until the market is
cleared again, i.e. if the market is run hourly, then the first 12
values of the FIR after a price change are used to determine
5price elasticity, e.g.
θλ =
1
12
12∑
n=1
1
θλn
(10)
Clearing an electricity market considering cross-elasticity is
not needed in today’s deregulated power systems because the
loads that participate in existing DR schemes have a cross-
elastic time constant that is longer than the re-commitment
time of the system they participate in. For example, a factory
that reduces its consumption for an hour to meet the terms
of a DR contract will not compensate for this reduction in
the following hour, since it will cause an imbalance and be
penalised as a result. Instead, its cross-elastic time constant
depends on long term planning ranging from days to years,
far slower than day-ahead and real-time markets recommit bids
today. Small-scale DR, which indirect control leans towards,
can have a time-constant of just a few minutes, as seen
in the EcoGrid EU demand model. This time-constant is a
similar order of magnitude to the re-commitment frequency
in real-time markets today, which suggests that cross-elastic
effects must be fully incorporated into the market to obtain an
economically efficient and controllable outcome.
A method for clearing a market considering the cross-elastic
nature of the load was previously proposed in [20]. However,
the algorithm used does not converge on a solution if the
demand’s self-elasticity is smaller than its cross-elasticity. This
solution may work well in an hourly market, where the demand
characteristics are likely to lead to a solution, but in a five
minute market like EcoGrid EU, the cross-elastic terms are
larger than the self-elastic terms, hence our proposed modified
market structure.
Constraints (9c) and (9d) determine the flexible demand
limits. Constraint (9e) sets DR to zero for twice the FIR length,
h = 2 (uλ + nλ), so that market outcomes do not create
infeasible starting points for subsequent re-commitments.
The total demand and production from wind are defined in
(9f) and (9g). The regulating cost from conventional generation
is defined in (9h). The total power produced by conventional
generation is stated in (9i). Constraint (9j) is the balance
constraint, also considering the imbalance from wind and
inflexible demand, Bt, and feedback from the load, et. Con-
straints (9k) - (9y) dictate generator behavior like minimum
on-times and ramping characteristics that are in-line with the
Scandinavian regulating market today. Constraints (9k) and
(9l) define generator ramp rates. Constraints (9m) and (9n)
keep ramping constant for 15 minutes. Constraints (9o) and
(9p) ensure that a generator is at a fixed setpoint for at least
15 minutes. When used with the generator behavior of γt =
{1, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 2, 0...}, (9k)-(9p) result in a minimum
on-time of 45 minutes. Constraints (9q) and (9r) are maximum
regulation constraints. Constraints (9s) and (9t) are minimum
generation constraints. In the Scandinavian regulating market,
bids under 10MW must be activated in full, while bids above
10MW can be activated in part; the proportion of each bid to
be activated is described by the parameter χg. Constraints (9u)
and (9v) ensure that a generator is off when it bids zero into
the market. Constraints (9w) and (9x) determine whether any
up or down generation is active, according to binary variables
dt,s and lt,s respectively, and (9y) prevents simultaneous up
and down regulation.
For each scenario-based decision variable there exists a non-
anticipativity constraint that ensures its outcome is identical
across all scenarios in the first few time periods for which
prices are fixed, for example t = 1 . . . 6 if the market is cleared
every half hour. Scenarios for imbalance, B, are generated
using a non-parametric method. Bootstrapping is employed,
where historical outcomes are sampled with replacement. Sce-
narios for price-elasticity are normally distributed and scenario
reduction is done using the Fast Forward method [21].
Any imbalance after the market cleared is penalised by a
primary frequency reserve (PFR) energy cost, which is set to
the highest and lowest marginal cost for energy in each time
period.
EcoGrid EU market clearing code in the GAMS language
and without proprietary datasets is available in [22]. The main
EcoGrid EU market is a mixed integer quadratically con-
strained program (MIQCP) solved using the CPLEX solver.
C. Quantifying Volatility
We propose quantifying volatility using a rainflow counting
algorithm [23], which is traditionally used in material fatigue
and battery ageing analysis. The rainflow counting algorithm
is a simple but powerful tool and the result is intuitive;
Whenever there is a change of sign in the signal of interest, a
turning point is defined. The distance between turning points
is measured and binned for similar distances to give the
number of oscillations observed per day. The algorithm can
be described as
1) Reduce the time-series to sequential peaks and troughs.
2) Conceptually rotate the time-series 90◦, so that the time-
series starts at the top and ends at the bottom.
3) Represent each peak and trough as the source of water
that drips down the time-series.
4) Count the number of half-cycles by looking at where
the drops of water end, which is when either
a) The drop reaches the end of the time-series;
b) The the drop merges with the flow from an earlier
drop; or
c) An opposite peak or trough of greater magnitude
occurs.
5) Determine the distance of each half-cycle between its
start and end.
6) Pair up half-cycles of equal distance but opposite effect
(falling off a peak or trough).
In Fig. 4, trough half cycles are counted and the distance for
each cycle is measured for a time-series of DR. The total
number of full cycles (troughs plus peaks) in this example are
16, with an average amplitude of 80.6MW.
IV. RESULTS
A. The cause of the Cobweb effect
The main cause for the Cobweb effect is uncertainty, but
this can be further specified as structural uncertainty, that is
6Fig. 4. Rainflow counter, where the black lines are half-cycles used count
the number and amplitude of oscillations.
the linearisation of demand characteristics to fit into a market
structure, and aleatoric uncertainty, which is the intrinsic
randomness in natural processes. Structural uncertainty in our
system comes from the non-linear demand curve, assumed to
be linear in the market, and ignoring cross-elastic effects in
the market.
To understand which source of uncertainty causes the great-
est volatility, we performed simulations for Denmark for one
month for a range of different cases. The first case is one
with no DR. The second case is an open loop system, where
feedback is ignored by the market and left for faster moving
reserves like PFR to remedy. An open loop is unrealistic, be-
cause it requires no uncertainty in the source of an imbalance,
and undesirable, because it requires larger PFR capacity. The
next case is a closed loop system, where the market is run
as was originally designed, and feedback from an unexpected
response creates a new imbalance in subsequent market re-
commitments. In the fourth and fifth cases (Closed NL and
CE), feedback from non-linear and cross-elastic behaviour is
remedied by the market, one at a time, while the other is
left as an open loop imbalance. This allows us to identify
which is the bigger cause of the Cobweb effect. The sixth case
(Closed M) simulates a full closed loop but with a modified
market, where the full cross-elastic effects are modelled in
our novel market constraint (9b). Finally, demonstration results
are included. The demonstration cannot be directly compared
to simulated cases because it uses a local imbalance signal,
is subject to additional price delays, and is a pseudo-closed
loop where delayed meter data is used to update the demand
forecast.
Fig. 5 shows a simulation day with outcomes demand price
and consumption, regulating price for generation, and regu-
lating power activated respectively. In a closed-loop system,
oscillating behaviour is seen in both generation and load. In an
open loop system, similar volatility as the closed loop system
can be seen in the first few hours of demand price, but this
does not translate to volatility on the generation side. Increased
volatility is therefore not a problem in itself from a market
perspective - DR increases volatility of the demand even when
expectation of demand is perfect, and this is to be cherished
if DR is to help balance volatile renewable energy production.
However, increased activation of regulating power is a clear
indicator of the Cobweb effect in action.
Table I summarises the number of cycles counted by the
rainflow counting algorithm for different cases. There is an
increase in demand cycles across all scenarios with DR, which
occurs naturally as the demand becomes dynamic. There is a
reduction in supply cycles for all DR cases, which should be
interpreted as fewer regulating bids being committed, which
in turn means that DR has achieved its goal of reducing
reliance on conventional power generation. The closed loop
experiences the most volatile pricing, as it has the most supply
price cycles.
Table II shows the cycle amplitude summed per day. For
supply and demand, this relates to the total amount of balanc-
ing power activated, and for prices, this represents the sum of
P
ri
ce
[e
/M
W
h
]
Open loop demand price
Closed loop demand price
P
o
w
er
[G
W
]
Open loop demand
Closed loop demand
P
ri
ce
[e
/M
W
h
]
Open loop supply price
Closed loop supply price
Time [Hours]
P
o
w
er
[G
W
]
Open loop supply
Closed loop supply
00 02 04 07 09 12 14 16 19 21 00
00 02 04 07 09 12 14 16 19 21 00
00 02 04 07 09 12 14 16 19 21 00
00 02 04 07 09 12 14 16 19 21 00
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
20
40
60
80
1
2
3
4
5
-50
0
50
100
150
Fig. 5. Prices and power for supply and demand for an open- and closed-loop
simulation day.
7changes in activation price. Higher demand cycle amplitudes
in all DR cases suggests load shifting is occurring. Real-
time price amplitudes are lowest in the open loop and the
Closed NL case, suggesting they behave in a similar manner
and that feedback from a non-linear demand curve is less
significant for volatility. In the original closed loop design
and the Closed CE case, demand price amplitude is quadruple
the open loop case. Daily supply and supply price amplitudes
paint a similar picture, with the greatest volatility in the cases
with feedback from cross-elasticity, and less volatility in the
non-linear feedback case. The modified case should be directly
compared to the closed loop case, where it exhibits half the
supply volatility and a reduction of 46% in supply price.
Despite this, it exhibits higher supply amplitudes (but at a
lower price) than the zero-DR case, suggesting the Cobweb
effect is still present here, but the market is able to exploit
lower generation cost in spite of volatility.
B. Demand response penetration
To see if the Cobweb effect increases cost, cases were
simulated for different levels of DR penetration. DR pene-
tration was scaled from 0% to 100%, as shown in Fig. 6.
The upper limit assumes that all of Denmark behaves like
an EcoGrid EU load and represents a DR peak response
about twice that of DR in the Nord Pool day-ahead market
today, albeit with significantly more activations due to a lower
price-elasticity characteristic (i.e. DR is cheaper to activate).
DR penetration beyond 30% results in a reduction in social
welfare in the closed-loop system, as the cost of volatility
outweighs the benefit of DR. The case where feedback stems
from cross-elastic effects (Closed CE) results in equally low
social welfare, while the case where only non-linear effects
are feedback has a very similar result to the open loop case.
As with the rainflow counting results, this confirms that cross-
elasticity is a bigger cause of the Cobweb effect than the non-
linear demand curve. Finally, the modified market, which is
a full closed loop, successfully increases social welfare for
all levels of DR penetration. At low levels of DR penetration,
social welfare gains are very small compared to the other cases
because the modified market treats DR far more rigidly with
fewer activations when it knows that a rebound will occur
after 90 minutes. Lower DR activations means that costly
conventional generator bids are activated instead, when leaving
residual imbalances to faster moving reserves might have been
more cost efficient.
TABLE I
AVERAGE CYCLES PER DAY
Demand Demand price Supply Supply price
[Cycles] [Cycles] [Cycles] [Cycles]
No DR 62.9 0 20.4 13.1
Open 58.6 56.8 15.9 10.8
Closed 39.6 38.9 18.1 15.7
Closed NL 56.1 56.1 15.9 10.8
Closed CE 36.7 39.4 16.9 14.8
Closed M 75.0 88.6 17.1 13.9
Demo 65.9 73.3 24.5 15.0
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Fig. 6. Social welfare as a function of DR penetration. There is a reduction
in social welfare as DR reaches significant proportions in closed-loop cases
that do not account for a cross-elastic response.
Fig. 6 shows that DR has the potential to significantly
increase social welfare in a real-time market, but only when
cross-elasticity is explicitly optimized for in the market. How-
ever, this result should be moderated by the fact that revenue
here is significantly smaller than in the day-ahead market,
where DR volumes are less according to the EcoGrid EU
demand model. In addition, this result is only applicable to the
winter months when DR from heating in Denmark is expected
to be active, so the year-round gain will be lower. The results
are also highly dependent on assumptions about the supply
curve; should DR become a significant reality, it’s possible
that bidding strategies would evolve.
C. Market re-commitment frequency
System dynamics change as system operators move to
shorter settlement periods, like five minutes in the EcoGrid
EU market, shorter gate-closure times, and more regular unit
re-commitments to reduce the impact of RES uncertainty. We
investigated re-commitment frequency by increasing how often
the market was cleared from 15 minutes to 150 minutes in 15
minute intervals. The settlement period remains five minutes
throughout (i.e. prices and set-points are valid for five minutes
at a time), but new decisions are only taken every time the
TABLE II
AVERAGE SUM OF CYCLE AMPLITUDES PER DAY
Demand Demand price Supply Supply price
[GWh] [e /MWh] [GWh] [e /MWh]
No DR 1.9 0 1.4 141.5
Open 4.3 482.8 1.1 91.5
Closed 16.1 2013.8 4.7 217.9
Closed NL 4.7 507.7 1.2 98.7
Closed CE 15.6 2122.0 4.2 224.9
Closed M 5.2 1690.3 2.3 133.1
Demo 3.8 125.2 3.6 72.9
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Fig. 7. Social welfare increases and volatility decreases as the re-commitment
frequency is reduced in the standard closed-loop case.
market is cleared. The theoretical benefit of using a higher re-
commitment frequency is that newer forecasts with less uncer-
tainty can be used, leading to lower costs and therefore higher
social welfare. Fig. 7 shows the outcome of changing unit
commitment frequency on generation volatility and social wel-
fare. The cross-elastic market exhibits similar behaviour for all
timings, while the closed loop market actually exhibits lower
volatility and higher social welfare for longer re-commitment
intervals, which is the opposite to what would traditionally
be expected. Volatility here translates to more generator bids
being activated for more frequent re-commitments. The local
peak in volatility at 45 minutes suggests also that the market
clearing frequency is resonating with the minimum-on time for
generation, and highlights additional market design challenges.
V. CONCLUSION
We have provided evidence that the Cobweb effect impacts
the EcoGrid EU market, provoking costly oscillations on the
supply side. In our case, the Cobweb effect causes three times
more generator bids to be activated than in a market with
no DR, leading to higher costs and lower social welfare.
We observed that the non-linear demand curve does cause
the Cobweb effect, but not enough to reduce social welfare.
However, ignoring cross-elasticity in a market does lead to
significant volatility and reduced social welfare. To mitigate
this, we have directly incorporated cross-elasticity into the
optimization problem. Such a solution may appear obvious, yet
new, DR-focussed market designs that ignore cross-elasticity
continue to appear in the literature [7], [24]. Reducing re-
commitment frequency may be another option for reducing
the Cobweb effect.
The question remains whether markets are the right tool to
control fast-moving, non-linear DR. Our market and demand
models are unlikely to capture all sources of volatility, and
our measure for social welfare does not count all the costs
that stem from it. Voltage and frequency instability could
result from a seemingly small amount of volatility, and future
research should determine how much volatility is acceptable.
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